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Abstract 
We study a three-country three-firm free trade area (FTA) trade model with rules of origin (ROO) under international 
R&D competition. The external tariff is chosen by the country importing final goods in the FTA. If the FTA chooses a 
higher content rate of ROO, the country importing final goods chooses a higher tariff in order to compensate for lower 
consumer surplus. We have three results. First, if the FTA raises the content rate, it raises the costs of exporters within 
the area, but if the R&D cost is sufficiently low, the exporters actually increase exports and their profits also increase. 
Second, if the firms within the FTA are less efficient than outsiders, the social welfare of countries importing final 
goods is affected by the content rate in a U-shaped fashion. A tightening of ROO may reduce the social welfare of 
importing countries since it may replace productive firms outside the FTA with less productive local firms. Third, if 
the productivity within an FTA is relatively high, the optimal content rate of ROO for the importing country within the 
FTA is 100%. In that case, the country importing final goods does not need to rely on imports from outside. Since an 
increase in the content rate of ROO increases external tariff, the most stringent ROO requirement is desirable for that 
country.
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1 Introduction
In a free trade area (FTA), in order to distinguish between intra-regional trade and ex-
ternal trade, rules of origin (ROO) are necessary, and a majority of FTAs have introduced
and imposed one or another form of ROO.1 Overall, in order to beneﬁt from duty-free
access to a member country’s market within an FTA, manufacturers of ﬁnal goods must
include a minimum fraction of inputs produced within the region. ROO limit the use
of inputs produced outside the region and they protect relatively less eﬃcient countries
within the region. In particular, ROO create cost diﬀerences between ROO-compliant and
non-complaint ﬁrms.
Numerous studies in the past have focused on ROO’s protective nature, including
Krueger (1999), Lopez-de-Silanes et al. (1996), Falvey and Reed (2002), and Takauchi
(2010a, b). However, these studies primarily examined ﬁrms’ export activities without
adequately considering their R&D activity. ROO considerably inﬂuence exporting ﬁrms
that engage in cost-reducing R&D activity because they create cost diﬀerences between
ROO-compliant and non-compliant ﬁrms. As indicated by Barros and Nilssen (1999)
and Lahiri and Ono (1999), a low-cost ﬁrm undertakes a more substantial cost-reducing
investment than a high-cost one. As a result, a major ﬁrm’s market share expands owing
to cost-reducing R&D competition.2 Therefore, the welfare implication of ROO is crucial
for ﬁrms engaged in cost-reducing R&D activity.
This paper examines the manner in which ROO inﬂuence ﬁrms’ behavior and social
welfare once the manufacturers of ﬁnal goods engage in cost-reducing R&D competition
and the countries importing ﬁnal goods within an FTA establish an optimal external
tariﬀ. To examine the manner in which ROO inﬂuence the social welfare of each country
when ﬁrms engage in cost-reducing R&D competition, we built a simple three-country
(two countries within an FTA and one outside the FTA), three-ﬁrm (one ﬁrm belonging
to each of the abovementioned two countries within the FTA and one belonging to the
country outside that FTA), oligopolistic trade model with ROO. We consider the following
three-stage game. In the ﬁrst stage, the country importing ﬁnal goods within the FTA
establishes the external tariﬀ. In the second stage, each ﬁrm undertakes R&D investment.
Finally, each ﬁrm in the country importing ﬁnal goods within the FTA competes ` a la
Cournot.
Considering R&D rivalry, the following three results emerge. First, when the eﬃciency
of R&D is suﬃciently high, the output, R&D investment, and proﬁt of the exporting ﬁrm
within an FTA increase owing to an increase in ROO requirement. An increase in the
ROO requirement leads to an increase in optimal external tariﬀ, and this eﬀect of ROO
1At least 93 preferential trade agreements (PTAs; including FTAs) have adopted a certain type of ROO
(Estevadeordal and Suominen, 2003).
2Following the study of Spencer and Brander (1983), several studies examining cost-reducing R&D,
competition, and industrial policy (i.e., R&D subsidy) have been conducted. For example, Leahy and
Neary (1996, 1999) examined the eﬀects of strategic R&D subsidy on ﬁrms’ operations and each country’s
welfare. Furthermore, a recent study identiﬁed the initial cost heterogeneity of ﬁrms. Ishida et al. (2010)
focused on the competitive eﬀects of the initial cost diﬀerences among ﬁrms.
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dominates all other eﬀects when the eﬃciency of R&D is suﬃciently high. As pointed
out by Lopez-de-Silanes et al. (1996), a tightening of ROO shifts rent from complying
exporters to non-complying exporters. However, this rent-shifting eﬀect of ROO may help
complying exporters in an R&D competition with optimal external tariﬀ. This point has
been dropped in the literature of ROO and, therefore, it is worthwhile to consider the role
of ROO in ﬁrms’ competition.
Second, there are ranges of production eﬃciency within the FTA such that the welfare
of a country importing ﬁnal goods is U-shaped for the ROO requirement. Similar to Lahiri
and Ono’s (1988) reasoning, the welfare-enhancing production substitution eﬀect of ROO
is a key factor. When the productivity of an external ﬁrm is relatively high, increasing
the stringency of ROO reduces the welfare of a country importing ﬁnal goods. This is
because increasing the stringency of ROO increases the external tariﬀ and, therefore,
reduces imports from an external ﬁrm. Conversely, when the productivity of an external
ﬁrm is relatively low, an increase in the ROO requirement improves the welfare of that
country. Since the welfare of the importing country within the FTA is U-shaped for the
ROO requirement, an intermediate level of the ROO requirement minimizes the welfare
of that country.
Third, if the productivity within an FTA is relatively high, the optimal content rate
of ROO for the country importing ﬁnal good within the FTA is 100%. Conversely, if the
productivity within the FTA is relatively low, the optimal content rate for the importing
country is 0%. When the intra-regional productivity is high, the country importing ﬁnal
good does not need to rely on imports from outside the region. Since a higher content rate
corresponds to a higher rate of external tariﬀ, 100% of the ROO requirement is desirable
for that country.
In the literature on ROO, many studies emphasize the protective or welfare-enhancing
nature of ROO; that is, by introducing and tightening ROO, the national welfare of less
eﬃcient countries within an FTA could possibly increase. However, the following question
arises: Are ROO always a protective device for the less eﬃcient countries within an FTA?
We ﬁnd a condition that decides whether or not ROO are a protective device. Since this
condition depends on the productivity within an FTA, we can say that ROO do not always
have a protective nature.
2 Model
Consider an FTA comprising two countries, of which one country has and another
country does not have a market for ﬁnal goods. We identify the member country com-
prising a market for ﬁnal goods as country M, the other country without a market for
ﬁnal goods as country E, and the country outside the FTA as country O. We assume
that there are two manufacturers of ﬁnal goods within this FTA, one of which is located
in country M (say, ﬁrm M) and the other is located in country E (say, ﬁrm E). Further,
an exporter of ﬁnal goods is located outside this FTA (say, ﬁrm O). Firm E is limited by
ROO and, therefore, selects a mixed proportion of intermediate goods produced in coun-
tries M and O while exporting the ﬁnal goods to country M. This is plausible because
2
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ﬁrm E is exempted from paying external tariﬀ, τ, if it procures over the predetermined
quantity stipulated by ROO.3 Let us denote this ROO requirement as δ (0 ≤ δ ≤ 1).
In countries M and O, the intermediate good industries operate under perfect competi-
tion. However, the productivity of intermediate goods industry in country M is relatively
lower than that of other countries. In other words, k > kO(= 0), where k and kO indicate
the price of the intermediate goods in country M and country O respectively. Firm E’s
initial cost is reﬂected by the following equation: cE ≡ c + δk.4 However, as ﬁrm O’s ini-
tial cost is subject to external tariﬀ, it is reﬂected by the following equation: cO ≡ c + τ.
Further, we deﬁne ﬁrm M’s initial cost in the following manner: cM ≡ c+k.5 We assume
that ﬁrm E is relatively more technologically advanced as compared to ﬁrm M. In other
words, ﬁrm E can employ inputs obtained from multiple sources; however, ﬁrm M can
employ inputs obtained only from domestic sources. This restraint may be caused by
a trade barrier. For example, a suﬃciently high import tariﬀ t may be imposed on the
imported intermediate good. That is, k < t + kO = t holds. Then, the ﬁrm M never
uses the intermediate good originated from the outside. If this trade restriction is relaxed,
ﬁrm M does not use the domestic intermediate good. This is because, since ﬁrm M is a
domestic ﬁrm and it supplies the ﬁnal good to the domestic market, it is not constrained
by ROO. Therefore, ﬁrm M buys cheaper inputs from outside the FTA.
The unit production cost of ﬁrm i is represented in the following manner: ci − xi,
i = M,E,O, where xi indicates the degree of cost reduction, that is, it denotes each
ﬁrm i’s R&D level. Therefore, all ﬁrms control their input coeﬃcient. We focus on the
initial level of unit cost diﬀerences among all ﬁrms and not on R&D subsidies, taxes,
or spillovers. We deﬁne R&D cost in the following manner: φ(γ,xi) ≡ γ(xi)2, where γ
represents a positive constant.
The inverse demand for ﬁnal goods in country M is reﬂected by the following equation:
p = a−Q, with Q = qM +qE +qO, where Q and qi indicate the total sales of the product
and ﬁrm i’s output, respectively. The net proﬁt of ﬁrm i is presented in the following
manner:
πi ≡ (p(Q) − (ci − xi)) qi − γ(xi)
2
. (1)
Let us consider the following three-stage game. Stage 1: The government of country
M establishes the external tariﬀ. Stage 2: Each ﬁrm independently and simultaneously
determines the quantum of cost reduction, xi. Stage 3: Each ﬁrm independently and
simultaneously determines a quantity of product output, qi.
Final stage. In market competition, each ﬁrm i determines qi in order to maximize
(p(Q) − (ci − xi)) qi. From (1), the equilibrium output obtained during the ﬁnal stage is
represented in the following manner:
3For simplicity, we assume that ﬁrm E constantly complies with ROO throughout the analysis.
4The procurement cost is appropriately reﬂected in the following manner: k+(1−)k
O. This deﬁnition
is the same as that employed by Lahiri and Ono (1998, 2003).
5We assume that one unit of the intermediate good is required to produce one unit of the ﬁnal good.
3
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qi =







where α ≡ a − c > 0, i = M,E,O, yM ≡ k, yE ≡ δk, and yO ≡ τ.
Second stage. In the R&D stage, each ﬁrm i determines xi in order to maximize πi.
From (1) and (2), the equilibrium R&D level for each ﬁrm xi is reﬂected by the following
equation:
xi =
3[(4γ − 3)α − 3(4γ − 1)yi + 4γ
∑
j̸=i yj]
(4γ − 3)(16γ − 3)
. (3)
Substituting (3) into (2) yields the following output:
qi =
4γ[(4γ − 3)α − 3(4γ − 1)yi + 4γ
∑
j̸=i yj]












(4γ − 3)a + 4γ[3c + (1 + δ)k + τ]
16γ − 3
. (5)
In the second stage, the net proﬁt of each ﬁrm, (qi)
2 − φ(γ,xi), is presented in the
following manner:
πi = γ(16γ − 9)
[
(4γ − 3)α − 3(4γ − 1)yi + 4γ
∑
j̸=i yj








Subsequently, we derive the amount of consumer surplus in country M. Consumer
surplus is reﬂected by the following equation: CS = (1/2)Q2. Further, substituting (5) in








First stage. In this stage, the government of country M establishes the external tariﬀ.
Social welfare W in country M is deﬁned by the sum of consumer surplus (CS), ﬁrm M’s
net proﬁt (πM), and tariﬀ revenue (τqO), which is reﬂected in the following manner:
W ≡ CS + πM + τqO. (8)
Substituting (2), (6), and (7) into (8) and solving the ﬁrst-order condition for welfare
maximization with respect to τ, country M’s optimal external tariﬀ is presented in the
following manner:6
6The welfare function in country M is indicated in the Appendix. See (W.1) and (W.2).
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3(2γ − 1)(4γ − 3)α − 2γ(4γ + 3)k
]
+ 8γ(9 − 51γ + 56γ2)kδ





Overall, (9) indicates a positive relationship between τ∗ and δ. When δ rises, both produc-
tivity of manufacturers of ﬁnal goods and consumer surplus decreases (anti-competitive
eﬀect of ROO). However, since the imports from external ﬁrms increase (rent-shifting ef-
fect of ROO), country M increases the external tariﬀ in order to maintain domestic welfare
levels.
On the basis of equations (3) and (9), each ﬁrm’s R&D investment and total R&D
investment are given by
xM =
3(4γ − 1)(4γ − 3)α + [4γ(14γ − 3)δ − 9 + 66γ − 128γ2]k
224γ3 − 276γ2 + 90γ − 9
, (10)
xE =
3(4γ − 1)(4γ − 3)2α + (4γB1 + B2δ)k
(4γ − 3)(224γ3 − 276γ2 + 90γ − 9)
, (11)
xO =
(4γ − 3)(3 − 18γ + 16γ2)α + 2γ(9 − 56γ + 64γ2 − 4γδ)k
2(4γ − 3)(224γ3 − 276γ2 + 90γ − 9)
, (12)
X =
3(15 − 82γ + 80γ2)α − 2k[(4γ − 3)(14γ − 3)δ + B1]
2(224γ3 − 276γ2 + 90γ − 9)
, (13)
where X = xM + xE + xO, B1 ≡ 9 − 45γ + 40γ2, and B2 ≡ 27 − 234γ + 612γ2 − 448γ3.
Therefore, the respective equilibrium outputs for ﬁrms M, E, and O are given by qM =
(4/3)γxM, qE = (4/3)γxE, qO = 4γxO; further, Q = (4/3)γX.
We must assume that γ > 0.786001 to ensure that the quantities supplied by ﬁrms
have a ﬁnite value. The output and R&D investment of ﬁrms possibly diverge when
γ > 0.786001 does not hold.7






−(4γ − 3)(3 − 18γ + 16γ2)
2γ(9 − 56γ + 64γ2) − 8γ2δ
≡ ϵ.
This assumption requires that the optimal external tariﬀ is at least lower than the pro-
hibitive tariﬀ level: it means that xO > 0. We can show that when γ ≥ (1/16)(9+
√
33) ≃
0.921535, Assumption 1 always holds since ϵ is negative. In other words, when the eﬃ-
ciency of R&D is not too high, the optimal external tariﬀ is always lower than the pro-
hibitive tariﬀ level. However, when the eﬃciency of R&D is suﬃciently high, the internal
ﬁrms’ productivity should not be too high.8
7In the second stage of the game, the second-order condition of proﬁt maximization is  > 9=16 = 0:5625
for all ﬁrms. However, the external tariﬀ is determined in the ﬁrst stage of the game and the rate of external
tariﬀ aﬀects the level of ﬁrms’ R&D investment (and output). As a result, even if the second order condition
( > 9=16) holds, there are values of  such that ﬁrms’ R&D investments diverge (e.g., x
E and x
O diverge
if  = 0:75; all x
i diverge if  ≃ 0:786001).
8This is because, when the eﬃciency of R&D is suﬃciently high, the eﬀect of production eﬃciency
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3(4γ − 1)(4γ − 3)
(9 − 66γ + 128γ2) − 4γ(14γ − 3)δ
≡ ξ.
Assuming ﬁrm M is manufacturing goods under the most stringent conditions with respect
to procurement of intermediate goods (i.e., k), then all ﬁrms undertake positive production
as long as the above assumption holds (xM > 0). Our model needs that ξ > k/α > ϵ.
We can show that in our model, there are ranges of k/α such that ξ > k/α > ϵ (see
Appendix).
Hence, we obtain the following lemma:
Lemma 1. The social welfare in country M is strictly concave with respect to external
tariﬀ.
Proof : Diﬀerentiating the welfare function (W.1) twice with respect to τ yields
∂2W
∂τ2 =
γ(216 − 2160γ + 6624γ2 − 5376γ3)
(9 − 60γ + 64γ2)
2 .
By numerical calculation, solving 216 − 2160γ + 6624γ2 − 5376γ3 ≤ 0 with respect to γ
yields that γ ≥ 0.786001. Therefore, (∂2W/∂τ2) < 0. Q.E.D.
The net proﬁt of ﬁrms is πM = (1/16γ)(16γ − 9)(qM)
2, πE = (1/16γ)(16γ − 9)(qE)
2, and
πO = (1/4γ)(16γ − 9)(qO)
2, respectively.
From (10) to (13), we establish the following result.
Proposition 1. An increase in the content rate of ROO δ [i] increases (decreases) the
output, R&D investment, and proﬁt of ﬁrm M (ﬁrm O); [ii] increases (decreases) the
output, R&D investment, and proﬁt of ﬁrm E if γ < (>) 0.817104; and [iii] is always
detrimental to consumers and decreases total R&D investment.
Proof : See Appendix.
As indicated by Lopez-de-Silanes et al. (1996), in a Cournot competitive market,
increasing the stringency of ROO requirements shifts rent from ROO-compliant to non-
compliant ﬁrms. Therefore, Proposition 1 has an interesting feature. The reasoning behind
this result is as follows. First, increasing the stringency of the ROO requirement (i.e., an
increase in δ) shifts rent from ﬁrm E to other ﬁrms (M and O). However, as previously
mentioned, the optimal external tariﬀ increases with an increase in δ. When the eﬃciency
of R&D is suﬃciently high (i.e., γ < 0.81704), the optimal external tariﬀ rises sharply as δ
increases. Second, economies of scale are eﬀective because ﬁrms engage in R&D competi-
tion. When the eﬃciency of R&D is not too high (i.e., γ > 0.817104), the exports of ﬁrm
E decrease due to an increase in δ, because optimal external tariﬀ does not suﬃciently
increase due to an increase in δ. In other words, it is considered necessary for country
M to concentrate on the production of the domestic ﬁrm (ﬁrm M) when the eﬃciency of
R&D is not too high.
strengthens extremely. If the internal ﬁrms’ productivity is too high (i.e., k is too low), the ﬁnal good
importing country does not need to rely on the outside ﬁrm and stops importing from the outside.
6
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3 Welfare implications
In this section, we focus on the manner in which a change in the ROO requirement
inﬂuences a country’s welfare. First, we verify the welfare function with respect to the
ROO requirement.
Lemma 2. Second derivative of social welfare in country M with respect to δ is always
positive.




16(kγ)2(9 − 48γ + 56γ2)
3(4γ − 3)(224γ3 − 276γ2 + 90γ − 9)
.
From the numerator of the abovementioned equation, solving 9 − 48γ + 56γ2 ≥ 0 with
respect to γ yields the following result: γ ≥ (3/28)(4+
√
2). From the denominator of the
abovementioned equation, solving 224γ3 − 276γ2 + 90γ − 9 ≥ 0 with respect to γ yields
the following result: γ ≥ 0.786001. Thus, Lemma 2 holds. Q.E.D.
Lemma 2 and the welfare function in country M (W.2) yield the following result.
Proposition 2. There exists 0 < δm < 1, which minimizes the welfare in country M if





9 − 78γ + 112γ2,
where
δm =
(9 − 78γ + 112γ2)k − 3(4γ − 3)α
2(9 − 48γ + 56γ2)
.
Proof : See Appendix.
Proposition 2 demonstrates that the welfare of a country importing ﬁnal goods within
the FTA is U-shaped for the ROO requirement if production eﬃciency within the FTA
is relatively less eﬃcient. This conclusion is comparable to Lahiri and Ono’s (1988) rea-
soning. In other words, the welfare-enhancing (or diminishing) production substitution
eﬀect of ROO is a key factor. First, we consider the case in which δ ≤ δm. A relatively
signiﬁcant k/α implies that the productivity of ﬁrm O is relatively higher than that of
other ﬁrms. An increase in the ROO requirement (i) increases the optimal rate of external
tariﬀ τ∗, and it reduces exports of ﬁrm O and (ii) decreases production. In other words,
it replaces productive ﬁrms outside the FTA with less-productive regional ﬁrms engaged
in manufacturing ﬁnal goods. Hence, the welfare level of the importing country decreases.
Next, we consider the case where δ ≥ δm. In this case, since δ is suﬃciently high, τ∗ is
suﬃciently high, as well. Hence, contrary to δ ≤ δm, ﬁrm O is less productive in this case.
7
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An increase in δ increases production of ﬁrm M. The welfare level of an importing country
is enhanced due to an increase in δ because an increase in the proﬁt of the domestic ﬁrm
dominates all other eﬀects.
Last, we consider the optimal content rate of ROO for country M. From Lemma 2,
the welfare is convex with respect to the content rate, so the optimal content rate is either
0% or 100% (hereafter, we refer to the optimal content rate for country M as δ∗). From
the welfare of country M (W.2), we obtain the following result.





0 if k/α > kC
{0,1} if k/α = kC
1 if k/α < kC,
where kC ≡ [3(4γ − 3)]/[2γ(28γ − 15)].
Proof : From Lemma 2, the welfare function of country M is convex with respect to δ, so
the optimal content rate δ∗ is either 0% (δ∗ = 0) or 100% (δ∗ = 1). Using the welfare
function of country M (W.2), we obtain
W|=0 − W|=1 =
8kγ2[−3α(4γ − 3) + 2γ(28γ − 15)k]
3(4γ − 3)(224γ3 − 276γ2 + 90γ − 9)
.
Since 224γ3 − 276γ2 + 90γ − 9 > 0 for all γ > 0.786001, the following relation holds:
W|=1
{
≤ W|=0 if k/α ≥ kC
> W|=0 if k/α < kC,
where kC ≡ [3(4γ − 3)]/[2γ(28γ − 15)] > 0. Q.E.D.
Proposition 3 says that if ﬁrms within the FTA are more eﬃcient than outsiders (i.e.,
production eﬃciency within the FTA is relatively high), a 100% content rate maximizes
welfare in country M. The logic is very simple. When production eﬃciency within the
FTA is relatively high, country M does not need to rely on imports from the outside (ﬁrm
O). The volume of imports from the outside that is accounted to consumer surplus is
relatively small, thus it is desirable for country M to set the external tariﬀ as high as
possible. Conversely, if the production eﬃciency within the FTA is relatively low, country
M needs to rely on the imports from the outside. In this case, a 0% content rate is the
most desirable. This is because a lower content rate corresponds to a lower external tariﬀ
rate.
4 Conclusion
This paper focused on examining the R&D activity of ﬁrms manufacturing ﬁnal goods
and the manner in which ROO inﬂuence the behavior of ﬁrms and the welfare of each
8
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country. To consider the manner in which ROO inﬂuence international R&D competition,
we presented a simple three-country three-ﬁrm FTA model with ROO.
Considering cost-reducing R&D competition, we obtained three interesting results,
which are as follows. First, an increase in the ROO requirement increases the output,
R&D investment, and proﬁt of exporting ﬁrms within an FTA when the eﬃciency of R&D
investment is suﬃciently high. Second, the welfare levels of a country importing ﬁnal
goods within an FTA is U-shaped for the ROO requirement when the eﬃciency of R&D
is not too low and productivity of ﬁrms within the FTA is not relatively high. Third, if
the productivity within an FTA is relatively high (low), the optimal content rate of ROO
for the country importing ﬁnal goods within the FTA is 100% (0%).
Appendix
Alternative condition of Assumption 1: From (12), we obtain
xO > 0 ⇔ (4γ − 3)(3 − 18γ + 16γ2)α + 2kγ(9 − 56γ + 64γ2 − 4γδ) > 0.
Therefore, if γ > 0.786001, 2kγ(9 − 56γ + 64γ2 − 4γδ) is always positive for all δ ∈
[0,1]. Thus, if the coeﬃcient of α is positive, xO > 0. 3 − 18γ + 16γ2 ≥ 0 for all
γ ≥ (1/16)(9 +
√
33 ). Therefore xO > 0 if γ ≥ (1/16)(9 +
√
33 ).
Next, we consider the case that γ < (1/16)(9 +
√
33 ). In this case, the coeﬃcient of α is
negative. Thus,




−(4γ − 3)(3 − 18γ + 16γ2)
2γ(9 − 56γ + 64γ2) − 8γ2δ
≡ ϵ.
The above condition k/α > ϵ is equivalent to τ0 − τ∗ > 0, where τ0 is a prohibitive tariﬀ
level (derived from (4) in the second stage) and τ0 ≡ [(4γ −3)α+4γ(1+δ)k]/[3(4γ −1)].
To see this, we consider the diﬀerence between τ0 and τ∗.
τ0 − τ∗ =
(16γ − 3)
{
(4γ − 3)(3 − 18γ + 16γ2)α + k
[
2γ(9 − 56γ + 64γ2) − 8γ2δ
]}
6(4γ − 1)(224γ3 − 276γ2 + 90γ − 9)
.
Thus, from the numerator, the condition τ0 − τ∗ > 0 is equivalent to k/α > ϵ.
Welfare function in country M: Substituting (4), (6), and (7) into (8) yields the
following welfare function in country M:
9
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W(τ,δ) = γ
[
(88γ − 9)(4γ − 3)2(a2 + c2) + (8γ − 3)(27 − 216γ + 304γ2)k2




(4γ + 3)(8γ − 3)τ + k(9 − 108γ + 160γ2)δ − 4(9 − 51γ + 56γ2)δτ




2k2γ(2γ − 1)(8γ − 3)δ2 − (−9 + 90γ − 276γ2 + 224γ3)τ2




Aα + (27 − 300γ + 252γ2)ac
(4γ − 3)(16γ − 3)2
]
, (W.1)
where A ≡ [27 + 32γ2(9 + δ) − 12γ(19 + 3δ)]k − 6(3 − 14γ + 16γ2)τ.
Under the optimal external tariﬀ, country M’s welfare (W.1) becomes
W(δ) = 6γ
{
(6 − 39γ + 40γ2)(a2 + c2) +
[
9 + 64γ2 − 4γ(14 + δ)
]
ck




18γ(39 − 4δ + 4δ2) − 81 + 64γ3(25 − 14δ + 7δ2) − 27γ2(79 − 26δ + 16δ2)




2(6 − 39γ + 40γ2)c +
[
9 + 64γ2 − 4γ(14 + δ)
]
k
3(224γ3 − 276γ2 + 90γ − 9)
}
. (W.2)











4γ(27 − 234γ + 612γ2 − 448γ3)k











4γ(4γ − 3)(14γ − 3)k
3(224γ3 − 276γ2 + 90γ − 9)
.
From these equations, we obtain the following relationships: [i] (∂qM/∂δ) > 0 for all
γ > 0.786001, because, 224γ3 − 276γ2 + 90γ − 9 > 0 holds for all γ > 0.786001. [ii]
(∂qE/∂δ) > (<)0 if γ < (>)0.817104, because, 27−234γ+612γ2−448γ3 > 0 if 0.314277 <
γ < 0.817104 or γ < 0.234691. In addition, we ﬁnd that 27 − 234γ + 612γ2 − 448γ3 < 0
if 0.234691 < γ < 0.314277 or γ > 0.817104. [iii] (∂qO/∂δ) < 0 for all γ > 0.786001,
because, 224γ3−276γ2+90γ−9 > 0 holds for all γ > 0.786001. [iv] (∂Q/∂δ) < 0 for all γ >
0.786001, because, 224γ3−276γ2+90γ−9 > 0 holds for all γ > 0.786001. Subsequently, the
following relationships hold. Since (∂πi/∂δ) = βiqi(∂qi/∂δ), sign{∂πi/∂δ} = sign{∂qi/∂δ}
holds, where βh = (1/8γ)(16γ − 9) for h = M,E and βO = (1/2γ)(16γ − 9). Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2: Diﬀerentiating the welfare function of country M (W.2) with
respect to δ yields
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3(4γ − 3)α + [2(9 − 48γ + 56γ2)δ − (9 − 78γ + 112γ2)]k
3(4γ − 3)(224γ3 − 276γ2 + 90γ − 9)
.
From the above equation, 224γ3 − 276γ2 + 90γ − 9 > 0 for all γ > 0.786001. Thus, the









3(4γ − 3)α − 9(2γ − 1)k
]
3(4γ − 3)(224γ3 − 276γ2 + 90γ − 9)
.
From the above equation, (∂W/∂δ)|=1 > 0 if (4γ − 3)/[3(2γ − 1)] > k/α. However,
(∂W/∂δ)|=1 > 0 always holds. This is because since ξ is increasing for δ and ξ|=1 =
(4γ − 3)/[3(2γ − 1)], ξ ≤ (4γ − 3)/[3(2γ − 1)]. We can omit the case in which (4γ −
3)/[3(2γ − 1)] ≤ k/α.









3(4γ − 3)α − (9 − 78γ + 112γ2)k
]
3(4γ − 3)(224γ3 − 276γ2 + 90γ − 9)
.
Therefore, (∂W/∂δ)|=0 < 0 if [3(4γ − 3)]/(9 − 78γ + 112γ2) < k/α. We ﬁnd that
ξ|=0 −
3(4γ − 3)
(9 − 78γ + 112γ2)
=
6(4γ − 3)(224γ3 − 276γ2 + 90γ − 9)
(9 − 78γ + 112γ2)(9 − 66γ + 128γ2)
> 0 for all γ > 0.786001.
Further, we ﬁnd that
3(4γ − 3)
(9 − 78γ + 112γ2)
−ϵ|=0 =
(4γ − 3)(8γ − 3)(224γ3 − 276γ2 + 90γ − 9)
2γ(9 − 56γ + 64γ2)(9 − 78γ + 112γ2)
> 0 for all γ > 0.786001.
Thus, ϵ|=0 < [3(4γ − 3)]/(9 − 78γ + 112γ2) < ξ|=0.
From the above argument, we obtain the following result: If [3(4γ−3)]/(9−78γ+112γ2) <
k/α, then an interior point δm (0 < δm < 1) exists and δm minimizes the welfare in country
M, where
δm =
(9 − 78γ + 112γ2)k − 3(4γ − 3)α
2(9 − 48γ + 56γ2)
.
Finally, let us verify that the welfare level is positive for suﬃciently large γ. Substituting
δm into (W.2) yields
W|=m = γ ×
4(5γ − 3)(4γ − 3)α2 + (16γ − 9)
{
3(2γ − 1)k − 2[a − (4γ − 3)c]
}
k
(4γ − 3)(9 − 48γ + 56γ2)
.
If γ ≥ 1, α ≡ a − c ≥ a − (4γ − 3)c. Using this equation and the numerator of the above
equation yields the following:
4(5γ − 3)(4γ − 3)α2 + 3(2γ − 1)(16γ − 9)k2 − 2(16γ − 9)[a − (4γ − 3)c]k
≥ 4(5γ − 3)(4γ − 3)α2 + 3(2γ − 1)(16γ − 9)k2 − 2(16γ − 9)αk ≡ Ω.
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16γ − 9 +
√
(16γ − 9)(99 − 524γ + 888γ2 − 480γ3)





16γ − 9 −
√
(16γ − 9)(99 − 524γ + 888γ2 − 480γ3)
(2γ − 1)(16γ − 9)
.
In the γ-k/α plane, critical curves h(γ) and h(γ) are located in the lower side of γ = 1
and equalized at a smaller value than γ = 1. h(γ) = h(γ) when γ ≃ 0.856996 < 1. Thus,
if γ ≥ 1, Ω > 0 for all k/α. Provided that γ ≥ 1, W|=m > 0 holds. Q.E.D.
Compatibility of Assumptions 1 and 2 (ξ−ϵ > 0): Note that ξ is always larger than







. If ϵ < k/α < ξ, all ﬁrms’ outputs are positive.
To see ξ − ϵ > 0, we consider the real roots of ξ − ϵ = 0, where
ξ − ϵ =
(4γ − 3)(−9 + 90γ − 276γ2 + 224γ3)[3 + 4γ(−4 + δ)]
2γ[9 + 64γ2 − 4γ(14 + δ)][−9 + γ(66 − 12δ) + 8γ2(−16 + 7δ)]
.


















































Figure 1: Graph of ξ − ϵ











Figure 2: Graph of (ξ − ϵ)|=0:786001
The function ξ − ϵ is increasing in both γ and δ, and (ξ − ϵ)|=0:786001; =0 = 5.48117 × 10 8 > 0.
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